Cournot Competition and Endogenous Firm Size by Francesco Saraceno & Jason Barr
Cournot Competition and Endogenous Firm
Size∗
Jason Barr†and Francesco Saraceno‡
Version 1 — Comments Welcome
May 31, 2004
Abstract
We model the ﬁrm as a type of artiﬁcial neural network that plays
a repeated Cournot game. Each period the ﬁrm must learn to map
environmental signals to both demand parameters and it’s rival’s out-
put choice. In this paper, though, this Cournot game is in the ’back-
ground,’ as we focus on the endogenous adjustment of network size.
We investigate the long-run behavior of ﬁrm/network size as a function
of proﬁts, rival’s size, and the type of adjustment rules used.
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11 Introduction
In this paper we explore ﬁrm size dynamics, with the ﬁrm modeled as a
type of artiﬁcial neural network (ANN). Two ﬁrms/networks compete at two
diﬀerent levels. The ﬁrst level, which has been explored in detail in other work
(Barr and Saraceno (BS), 2004; forthcoming), looks at Cournot competition
between two neural networks. In this paper, this level of competition is
essentially in the shadows, while the main form of strategic interaction is in
regards to ﬁrm size. The ﬁrm, while playing the repeated Cournot game, has
to make long run decisions about its size.; and size not only aﬀects its own
proﬁts, but its rival’s proﬁts as well.
O u rp r e v i o u sr e s e a r c hs h o w e dt h a tﬁrm size is a crucial determinant of
performance in an uncertain environment, but it was left exogenous. Here we
reverse the perspective: we take for given the learning process and the depen-
dence of ﬁrm proﬁt on size and environmental complexity, and we endogenize
ﬁrm size in order and investigate whether simple adjustment rules succeed
in yielding the ”optimal” (deﬁned as the result of a best response dynamics)
s i z e .W ee x p l o r et h ec o n c e p to fﬁrm size adjustment using simple adaptive
adjustment rules. The computational requirements needed to discover the
optimal ﬁrm size equilbria may be quite expensive; and thus we explore less
costly methods for adjusting ﬁrm size.
We ﬁnd that using these simple rules can often produce rather complex
long-run behavior. We ﬁnd that only under only very precise parameter
values does the ﬁrm converge to the actual Nash equilibrium size. And that,
in general, the ﬁrms using the simple rules actually have larger sizes but
lower proﬁts in the long run. Thus in many cases satisﬁcing behavior may
not produce optimal outcomes. But this deviation from optimality must be
analyzed in terms of the relative costs and beneﬁts: simple rules are less
expensive to implement, but proﬁts could be higher if the ﬁrm were close to
equilibrium size. While we don’t directly address this trade-oﬀ, we begin in
this paper by exploring the outcomes for ﬁrm size when ﬁrms use simple rule
of behavior.
1.1 Related Literature
Information Processing Organizations Our work relates to several
diﬀerent areas. As discussed in detail in other works (BS, 2002, forthcoming),
our approach to using a neural network ﬁts within the agent-based literature
2on information processing (IP) organizations (Chang and Harrington, forth-
coming). In this ﬁeld organizations are modeled as a collection or network of
agents that are responsible for processing incoming data. IP networks and
organizations arise because in modern economies no one agent can process all
the data, as well as make decisions about it. The growth of the modern cor-
poration has created the need for workers who are managers and information
processors (Chandler, 1962; Radner, 1993).
Typical models are concerned with the relationship between the struc-
ture of the network and the corresponding performance or cost (DeCanio
and Watkins, 1998; Radner, 1993). In this paper, the network is responsi-
ble for mapping incoming signals about the economic environment to both
demand and a rival’s output decision. Unlike other information processing
models, we explicitly include strategic interaction: one ﬁrm’s ability to learn
the environment aﬀects the other ﬁrm’s pay-oﬀs. Thus a ﬁrm must locate
an optimal network size not only to maximize performance from learning the
environment but also but also due to its rival’s actions. In our case, the ﬁrm
is able to learn over time as it repeatedly gains experience in observing and
making decisions about environmental signals.
Evolutionary Theory and Routines A second area of literature that
relates to our work is that of the evolutionary and ﬁrm decision making mod-
els of Nelson and Winter (1982), Simon (1982) and Cyret and March (1963).
In this area, the ﬁrm is also boundedly rational, but the focus is not on infor-
mation processing per se. Rather, the ﬁrm is engaged in a myriad of activities
from production, sales and marketing, R&D, business strategy, etc. As the
ﬁrm engages in its business activities it gains a set of capabilities that cannot
be easily replicated by other ﬁr m s .T h ep a t t e r n so fb e h a v i o rt h a ti tc o l l e c -
tively masters are know as its ’routines’ (Nelson and Winter,1982). Routines
are often comprised of rules-of-thumb behavior: continue to do something if
it is working, change if not.
In this vein, ﬁrms in our paper employ simple adjustment rules when
choosing a ﬁrm size. In a world where there is a lot of information to process
and where discovering optimal solutions are often computationally expen-
sive ﬁrms will seek relatively easier rules for behavior, ones that produce
satisfactory responses at relatively low cost (Simon, 1982).
3Complexity Theory and Firm Behavior T h en e x ta r e at h a to v e r -
laps with our work is that of complexity theory (Puu, 2003). We show that
simple adjustment rules, based on satisﬁcing behavior, can actually generate
very complex long-run dynamics. In fact, in a certain region of the para-
meter space, we ﬁnd that ﬁrm size patterns can exhibit chaotic behavior in
the long run. Though, based on proﬁtability, we have reasons to exclude
certain regions of the adjustment parameter space from being economically
plausible. Similar work in this area includes Currie and Metcalf (2001) who
show that prices can have chaotic behavior when ﬁrms employ relatively sim-
ple pricing, production and investment routines. Puu (2003) shows how a
monopoly’s output choices can be chaotic depending on the proﬁt function,
and the parameters used in a simple output adjustment rule. Kopel (1996)
explore complex dynamics in the Cournot frame work to show how output
patterns are dependent on the functional form of the proﬁt and best response
functions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
motivation for using a neural network as a model of the ﬁrm. Then, in section
3, we give a brief discussion of the set up of the model. A more detailed
treatment is given in the Appendix. Next, section 4 gives the benchmark
cases of network size equilibria. Section 5 discusses the heart of the paper—
the ﬁrm size adjustment algorithms and the results of the algorithms. Finally,
section 6 gives some concluding remarks.
2 N e u r a lN e t w o r k sa sM o d e l so ft h eF i r m
In previous work (BS, 2002; 2003) we argued that information processing is a
crucial feature of modern corporations, and that eﬃciency in performing this
task may be crucial in deﬁning success and failure. We further argued that
when focussing on this aspect of ﬁrm behavior, computational learning the-
ory may give useful insights and modelling techniques. In this perspective,
it is useful to view the ﬁrm as a learning algorithm, consisting of agents that
follow a series of rules and procedures organized in both a parallel and serial
manner. Firms learn and improve their performance by repeating their ac-
tions and recognizing patterns (i.e., learning by doing). As the ﬁrm processes
information, it learns its particular environment and becomes proﬁcient at
recognizing new and related information.
4Among the many possible learning machines, we focussed on Artiﬁcial
Neural Networks as models of the ﬁrm, because of the intuitive mapping
between their parallel processing structure and ﬁrm organization. Neural
networks, as other learning machines, generalize from experience to unseen
problems (as long as they are not too diﬀerent), i.e., they recognize patterns.
Firms (and in general economic agents) do the same: the know-how acquired
is used in tackling new problems, at least as long it does not prove completely
inadequate.
What is speciﬁc of ANNs is the parallel and decentralized processing.
ANNs are composed of multiple units processing very simple tasks (on-oﬀ)i n
parallel. The result of this multiplicity of simple jobs may be a very complex
task (as weather forecasting). In the same way ﬁrms are often composed of
diﬀerent units working autonomously on very speciﬁc tasks, and coordinated
by a management that merges the results of these simple operations in order
to design complex strategies.
Furthermore, the ﬁrm, like learning algorithms, faces a trade-oﬀ linked to
the complexity of its organization. Small ﬁrms are likely to attain a rather
imprecise understanding of the environment they face; but on the other hand
they act pretty quickly and are able to design decent strategies with small
amounts of experience. Larger and more complex ﬁrms, on the other hand,
produce more sophisticated analyses, but they need time and experience
to do so. Thus, the complexity of the environment is a crucial element in
determining the optimal design of the learning machine. Likewise, the optimal
ﬁrm structures may only be determined in relation with the environment, and
it is likely to change with it. Unlike computer science, however, in economics
the search for an optimal structure occurs given a competitive landscape,
which imposes time and money constraints on the ﬁrm.
In our previous work we showed, by means of simulations, that the trade-
oﬀ between speed and accuracy generates a hump shaped proﬁtc u r v e ,i n
ﬁrm size (BS, 2002). We also showed that as complexity of the environment
increases the ﬁrm size that maximizes proﬁt also increases. These results
reappeared when we applied the model to Cournot competition. We were
also able to show that environmental complexity aﬀects the propensity to
cooperate of ﬁrms (BS, 2004). These results will constitute the background
o ft h ep r e s e n tp a p e r . H e r e ,w ew i l ll e a v et h eC o u r n o tc o m p e t i t i o na n dt h e
learning process in the background, and investigate how network size changes
endogenously.
53 Setup of the Model
The setup of the neural network model is taken from BS (2004) and BS (forth-
coming). Two ﬁrms compete in quantities facing a linear demand function
whose intercept is unobserved. Firms observe a set of environmental vari-
ables that are related to demand, and have to learn the mapping between
the two. But ﬁrms have to learn two variables: the demand intercept, and
their rival’s output choice. Appendix A gives the details of the model. Our
previous work shows that in general they are capable of learning how to map
environmental factors to demand, which allows the ﬁr m st oc o n v e r g et ot h e
Nash equilibrium. We further showed that the main determinants of ﬁrm
proﬁtability are, on one hand, ﬁrm sizes (i.e. the number of processing units
of the two ﬁrms, m1 and m2) ;a n do nt h eo t h e re n v i r o n m e n t a lc o m p l e x i t y ,
that we modeled as being the number of inputs of the network, i.e., the
number of environmental factors aﬀecting demand (n).
A few robust features of the learning process may be recalled here (the
reader is referred to BS (2004), and BS (forthcoming) for details about
the model and the results). (1) More complex environments yield, ceteris
paribus, lower proﬁt for both competitors. (2) In general, ﬁrm proﬁti s
hump shaped with respect to own size. A feature that reﬂects a trade-oﬀ
between speed and accuracy in the learning process (BS, 2002). (3) The
peak of the hump-shaped proﬁt function, i.e. the optimal ﬁrm size, shifts to
the right when complexity increases. In other words, optimal size increases
in more complex environments.
These facts may be captured by a polynomial in the three variables (in
our previous work other variables aﬀected proﬁt, but here we hold them
constant):
πi = f(m1,m 2,n) (1)
To obtain a speciﬁc numerical form for equation 1, we simulated the
Cournot learning process with diﬀerent randomly drawn ﬁrm sizes (m1,m 2 ∈
[2,20]) and complexity (n ∈ [5,50]), recording each time the proﬁto ft h et w o
ﬁrms. With such a data set we ran a regression, that is reported in table 1 in
the appendix (notice that the setup is symmetric, so that either ﬁrm could
be used).
The speciﬁc polynomial relating proﬁts to size and complexity, that will
serve as the basis for our ﬁrm size dynamics, is given in equation (2).
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These coeﬃcients are plotted to give better insight. In Figure 1 we can see
how own and rival’s size aﬀects a ﬁrm’s proﬁts, for a particular environmental
complexity (n =1 0 ). In general, proﬁti sh u m p e d - s h a p ei no w ns i z e ,a n di n
this case is declining in rival’s size. That is, as the rival increases size ﬁrm

















Figure 1: A ﬁrm’s proﬁt versus network size and rival’s network size, n =1 0 .
Figure 2 shows the hump shape of proﬁt with respect to own size. For
a particular complexity value, three curves are reported, corresponding to
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Figure 2: A ﬁrm’s proﬁt function vs own size (m2 =2 , solid line; m2 =1 0 ,
crosses; m2 =1 0 , diamonds). n =1 0 .
4 Network Size Equilibria
In this section, as a benchmark, we discuss the ﬁrms’ best response function
and equilibria that arise from the game.
4.1 The Best Response Function
Given the functional form for proﬁt, as shown in equation (2), we can derive
the best response function by setting the derivative of proﬁt with respect to
size equal to zero, i.e., given each choice of rivals network size, there exists








Notice however that the ’best response’ function is polynomial in mi and as
a result, there is generally more than one solution, and often some of the
solutions are complex numbers. Thus to solve for the best response function,
i.e., f0 (m∗
i,m −i,n)=0 , we perform the following steps: for each choice of
8rival’s network size m−i ∈ [2,20] we solve equation (3), and we discard all
but the positive and real solutions (in our simulations there is always exactly
one positive, real value solution for each m−i). This then gives us a new
data set that gives a map between m−i and m∗
i. Figure 3 shows the best
response mapping for equation (2). In fact, in spite of the complexity of the
proﬁt function, the best response is quasi-linear. Notice further the relation-
ship between the bet responses and environmental complexity: increasing
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Figure 3: Firm 1 best response functions (n =1 0 , solid line; n =2 5 , crosses;
n =5 0 , diamonds)
4.2 Equilibrium
Given the best response functions for each point, we can solve for the equi-
librium point. We ﬁnd that there is always only one equilibrium, as it was
to be expected given the quasi-linearity of the best response functions. As
we can see in ﬁgure 4, the equilibrium ﬁrm size is about 5.8 nodes for each
9ﬁrm.1
For each complexity level, we are able then to solve for the equilibrium
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Figure 4: Size equilibrium is determined at the intersection of the two best
responses: m1 = br(m2) (solid line) and m2 = br(m1) (dashed line). n =1 0 .
5w es h o wt h eﬁrm size equilibria and proﬁts as a function of complexity.
As can be seen, ﬁrm size is increasing in complexity, while ﬁrm proﬁts are
decreasing.
5 Adjustment Dynamics
As discussed above, ﬁrms face a large amount of information to process. In
standard economic theory, ﬁrms are assumed to understand how the world
functions. Meaning, they are assumed to know their cost functions, proﬁt
functions, and the eﬀect of a rival’s decisions on proﬁts. But in a complex
world, with boundedly rational agents, the cost to discover such knowledge
is relatively high. As a result, ﬁrms learn as they engage in their activities
and use this knowledge to help guide them.
1For simplicity we ignore the integer issue in regards to ﬁrm size and assume that ﬁrm





























Figure 5: Network size equilbria and proﬁts for each complexity level.
The knowledge that they have is acquired, in general, from following rel-
atively simple rules of behavior and general approximation schemes (Nelson
and Winter, 1982; Simon, 1982). That is to say, ﬁrms are not necessarily
concerned with what makes the world work the way it does, but rather are
concerned with learning the eﬀect of general action-reaction type behaviors.
For example, two ﬁrms producing oil, are presumably not concerned with
actual mathematical Cournot functions, so much as they are concerned with
learning: ’if my rival produces so much oil and I don’t, what range of prices
can I expect to charge for my oil?’ In other words, the existence of a equi-
librium, for example does not lead to the simple assumption that ﬁrms will
know what this equilibrium is and then select the correct response. But
rather, in a world where information processing and knowledge acquirement
are expensive, ﬁrms may ﬁnd it easier to behave according to simple rules of
actions, e.g., hire more workers if my proﬁti sp o s i t i v eo rh i g h e rm o r ew o r k e r s
if my proﬁts are growing, etc.
For this reason, in this section, we explore simple dynamics for ﬁrm size;
dynamics that basically do not assume any greater knowledge on the part of
ﬁrms then simply being able to observe the eﬀect of changing agents (nodes)
on proﬁts. The best response function in section 4.1 is quite complex, and if
is assumed that the ﬁrm knows it; more speciﬁcally, it is assumed to know
the expect maximal proﬁt obtainable for the entire range of a rival’s choice of
11network size.2 (Note also that the best response functions graphed above are
numerical approximations) But in a world in which production and market
conditions constantly change, past information may quickly become irrele-
vant. Meaning that even if a ﬁrm has perfect knowledge of its best response
function at a certain point in time, that function may quickly become out-
dated. That means that, even when in possession of the computational ca-
pabilities that are necessary to compute the best response, a ﬁrm may not
ﬁnd it convenient to actually do it.
Using the proﬁt function generated in section 3, we explore adjustment
dynamics for ﬁrms using rule-of-thumb type adjustment rules. As the level
of complexity in determining the equilibrium is quite complex, we assume
the following general adjustment dynamics:
mi,t =( 1− ρ)mi,t−1 + βπi,t−1 + αIi [(m−i,t−1 − mi,t−1)(π−i,t−1 − πi,t−1)] (4)
where ρ ∈ [0,1] is an exogenous ”quit rate” parameter; β represents the
sensitivity of ﬁrm size to proﬁts; it captures the ”trend” growth of the ﬁrm,
that is linked to proﬁt. The parameter α captures the ”imitation” factor
behind size adjustment; Ii is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if




1 ⇔ (π−i,t−1 − πi,t−1) > 0
0 ⇔ (π−i,t−1 − πi,t−1) ≤ 0
In case Ii =1 , then size will be adjusted in the direction of the oppo-
nents’. Thus, the ﬁrm will adjust towards the opponent’s size, whenever
it observes a better performance of the latter. Notice that if ρmi,t−1 >
βπi,t−1 + Ii [α(m−i,t−1 − mi,t−1)(π−i,t−1 − πi,t−1)], then the ﬁrm will reduce
its size, regardless of the imitation eﬀect sign, whereas if the contrary holds,
it will increase it.
We can think of the Cournot game as happening on a short term basis,
while the adjustment dynamics occurs on longer periods of time. Basically,
our questions is this section are: under what parameter choices using equation
(4) will ﬁrms reach the equilibrium level presented in Figure 4 and, what
kinds of behavior can we expect for ﬁrm size as a function of the parameter
space?
2A common assumption in game theory is that ﬁrms know the equilbrium and that
they know that their rival knows it, and they know that their rival knows they know it,
ad inﬁtinum (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1996).
125.1 Scenario 1: The Basic Case—The Isolationist Firm
Suppose that α =0 . Then each ﬁrm will only look at its own performance
when deciding whether to add or to remove nodes:
mi,t =( 1− ρ)mi,t−1 + βπi,t−1(mi,t−1,m −i,t−1) (5)
Of course, this does not mean that the ﬁrm’s own dynamics is independent
of the other, as in fact πi,t−1 d e p e n d so nb o t hs i z e sa tt i m et − 1. Suppose
further that size is below the Nash equilibrium value, m∗. Then, in order for





and vice versa if mi,0 >m ∗. The system will settle at the level given by the
solution of








For the ‘basic’ analysis we assume that the two ﬁrms begin with 2 nodes each
(holding n =1 0 ). This implies that their proﬁts will be the same, and the
dynamics will be the same as well. We can then look at only one of them.
Further, in this scenario, we place no integer restrictions or value restrictions
on the nodes other than the number of nodes is set to 1, if the value becomes
less than one. We explore the parameter space for β (holding ρ constant)
and see how the number of nodes and proﬁts evolve over the long run, i.e.,
we explore the limit points. Lastly, we investigate the relationship between
long run ﬁrm size and complexity (holding β constant.)
5.2 Scenario 2: The Imitationist Firm
In this case the contrary of the isolationist ﬁrm holds: each ﬁrm does not
simply care about its absolute situation, but rather about the comparison
w i t ht h eo t h e r . F o rs i m p l i c i t ys u p p o s et h a tt h eq u i tr a t ea n do w np r o ﬁt
adjustment parameter are zero: β = ρ =0 . Thus,
mi,t = mi,t−1 + Ii [α(m−i,t−1 − mi,t−1)(π−i,t−1 − πi,t−1)].
In this case, we also investigate the eﬀect of complexity on long run ﬁrm size.
135.3 Results
5.3.1 Scenario 1: The Basic Case
For n =1 0 , and two diﬀerent values of ρ, the equilibrium is given by ﬁgure
6. Quite intuitively, the higher the dropout rate ρ, the lower the equilibrium
size.










Figure 6: Equilibrium values of m1 = m2 as a function for β. Complexity is
ﬁxed at n =1 0 . Two values for ρ are plotted.
On the other hand, a larger β also implies a larger steady state value.
T h em o r er e a c t i v eﬁrms are to proﬁts, the larger their long run value will be.
Notice that this steady state value is in general not reached by the ﬁrms
following the isolationist rule. In fact, as shown in ﬁgure 7,only for low values
of β(= 0.01) the convergence is monotonic and to a value larger than the
steady state level of ﬁgure 6. For larger values, ﬁrms sizes begin oscillating,
the oscillation being wider the larger the value of β.

















Figure 7: Isolationist ﬁrm size dynamics for diﬀerent values of β.(ρ =0 .01,
and n =1 0 ) .
To explore the long run nature of the system given by equation (5), we
look at the steady state value as a function of β. Interestingly, over a certain
range of β we get complex dynamics, including chaos. Figure 8 gives the
bifurcation graphs for mj and ﬁgure 9 gives the average proﬁts versus β.
The results show that for a ﬁrm to rely on a simply heuristic to choose a
level of ﬁrm size can result in cyclical and even chaotic behavior over time.
Looking at average proﬁts, however, we see that proﬁts are maximized for
the ﬁrm for a small value of β.A n da sβ increases, proﬁts become increasing
volatile and after some point turn negative. Thus relatively large values of
β will not be feasible in the long run. The maximum proﬁt occurs when
β ∈ [0.00005,0.00045].
Interestingly, however, the two ﬁrms will achieve the Nash equilibrium
ﬁrm size when at approximately β =0 .004.
With β =0 .004 and ρ = .01, we investigate the relationship between
complexity and ﬁrm size and proﬁts. In Figure 10 we present the results of
15Figure 8: Bifurcation graph: Firm size versus β
this run.
Here we see a slight increase in both ﬁrm size and proﬁts as we increase
complexity. Increasing ﬁrm size with complexity is something we also see in
the equilibria benchmark cases, but here we have increasing proﬁts.
5.3.2 Scenario 2: The Imitationist
In this section we present the results from using the following adjustment
equation:
mi,t = mi,t−1 + Ii [α(m−i,t−1 − mi,t−1)(π−i,t−1 − πi,t−1)].
In this case, the ﬁrm will no change its size if it has a larger proﬁt, and it will
converge to the other if it has a smaller proﬁt. Thus, we can say a number of
things before feeding actual parameter values. First, at each period, only one
ﬁrm moves. Second, at the ﬁnal equilibrium, the two proﬁts must be equal,
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Figure 9: Average proﬁts as a function of β
situation. For n =1 0 , suppose one ﬁrm begins small (m1 =2 ) , and the other
large (m2 =1 5 ) . The resulting dynamics depend on α, as shown in ﬁgure 11
It may be seen that increasing values of α add noise, up to the point where
ﬁrm sizes ﬂuctuate. On the other hand, a too low value of α(= 0.01) does
not allow suﬃcient growth of the small ﬁrm to the point in which it attains a
proﬁtable size and forces an adjustment of the competitor. For intermediate
values, on the other hand, the two ﬁrms converge to similar sizes. Increasing
complexity, somewhat changes the situation (ﬁgure 12, where n =5 0 ). On
one side, larger ﬁrms are more proﬁtable, so that smaller ﬁrms are pushed
to change more even for low levels of α. On the other hand, though, the
oscillatory region begins earlier, i.e. for lower values of α, with respect to the
case of simpler environments.
Lastly we look at the eﬀect of complexity on long run ﬁrm size in this
scenario. Figure 13 presents the results
Interestingly we see that in this scenario, there is a bifurcation point at
about n =3 8 . At that point average proﬁts also become negative (results
not shown). Thus we can conclude that the imitationist scenario, given our

























Figure 10: Long Run Firm Size versus Complexity. β =0 .004,ρ=0 .01
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has presented a model of the ﬁrm as an artiﬁcial neural network.
In prior papers (BS, 2004; forthcoming) we have explored the relationship
between ﬁrm size, environmental complexity and rival’s size in a Cournot
game with uncertainty. There, sizes were exogenous parameters; in this paper
we explore the endogenous relationship between two ﬁrms long-run sizes. Via
regression analysis, we relate a ﬁrm’s proﬁt yielded by the Cournot game,
with its own size, its rival’s size and the environmental complexity; we ﬁnd it
to be a fourth-order polynomial. Using this proﬁt function, we then generate
the ﬁrm’s best response functions in sizes and related equilibria as a function
of environmental complexity. These results are used a benchmark for the
core of the paper, which looks at long-run ﬁrm size based on two types of
dynamic, adaptive rules: the ’isolationist’ and the ’imitationist.’ If a ﬁrm
uses an isolationist rule it updates its ﬁrm size each period as a function of
i t sl a s tp e r i o d ’ ss i z ea n dp r o ﬁts; ignoring it’s rival’s actions. The imitationist
rule has the ﬁrm adjusting its size based on last period’s size and comparison
with the rivals’ proﬁts.
Using the relatively simple rules, interestingly, generates some complex
behavior. First we ﬁnd that only under only very precise parameter values
does the ﬁrm converge to the Nash equilibrium size given by the best re-














































Figure 11: Firm dynamics for diﬀerent values of α. n =1 0 ,ρ=0 .
sponsed. And that in general, as a result of the dynamics, the ﬁrm’s are
larger, but also earn lower proﬁts. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that simple adjust-
ment rules are quite ’parameter sensitive.’ In fact, the long run ﬁrm size can
be either stable, oscillitory or chaotic depending on the values of the adjust-
ment parameters. If ﬁrm’s use the imitationist rule and start at diﬀerent
sizes, then whether they converge to the same size or not is also a function
of the adjustment parameters. Lastly, the relationship between long run
ﬁrm size and complexity is shown for speciﬁc adjustment parameter values.
In general ﬁrm size (and sometimes proﬁt) is increasing in complexity, but
sometimes in a highly non-linear way.
This paper is a ﬁrst attempt to understand the implications that the
interaction of two complex systems (neural networks) can have for simple—
boundedly rational—adjustment rules. Since both the behavior of the net-
works, the corresponding proﬁt functions and the adjustment rules are quite
complex, much work still needs to be done on exploring the robustness and












































Figure 12: Firm dynamics for diﬀerent values of α. n =5 0 ,ρ=0 .
generalizability of our ﬁndings. Furthermore, future work will seek to link
the ﬁndings with these models to stylized facts around ﬁrm growth and size
















Figure 13: Long Run Firm size versus complexity. β =0 ,ρ=0 .
21Appendix
A Neural Networks
This appendix brieﬂy describes the working of Artiﬁcial Neural Networks. For
a more detailed treatment, the reader is referred to Skapura (1996). Neural
networks are nonlinear function approximators that can map virtually any
function. Their ﬂexibility makes them powerful tools for pattern recognition,
classiﬁcation, and forecasting. The Backward Propagation Network (BPN),
that we used in our simulations, is the most popular network architecture. It
consists in a vector of x ∈ RN inputs, and a collection of processing nodes,
m ∈ I
M, organized in layers.
For our purposes (and for the simulations) we focus on a network with
a single layer. Inputs and nodes are connected by weights, wh ∈ RN×M,
t h a ts t o r et h ek n o w l e d g eo ft h en e t w o r k . T h en o d e sa r ea l s oc o n n e c t e dt o
an output vector y ∈RO, where O is the number of outputs (2 in our case),
and wo ∈ RM×O is the weight vector. The learning process takes the form
of successive adjustments of the weights, with the objective of minimizing
a (squared) error term.3 Inputs are passed through the neural network to
determine an output; this happens through transfer (or squashing) functions,
like the sigmoid, to allow for nonlinear transformations. Then supervised
learning takes place in the sense that at each iteration the network output
is compared with a known correct answer, and weights are adjusted in the
direction that reduces the error (the so called ‘gradient descent method’).
The learning process is stopped once a threshold level for the error has been
attained, or a ﬁxed number of iterations has elapsed. Thus, the working of
a network (with one hidden layer) may be summarized as follows. The feed

















where g(·) is the sigmoid function that is applied both to the input to the






3The network may be seen as a (nonlinear) regression model. The inputs are the inde-
pendent variables, the outputs are the dependent variables, and the weights are equivalent
to the regression coeﬃcients.






where y i st h et r u ev a l u eo ft h ef u n c t i o n ,c o r r e s p o n d i n gt ot h ei n p u tv e c t o r
x.
This information is then propagated backwards as the weights are ad-
justed according to the learning algorithm, that aims at minimizing the total
error, ξ. The gradient of ξ with respect to the output-layer weights is
∂ξ





since for the sigmoid function, ∂ˆ y/∂wo = ˆ y(1 − ˆ y).













Once the gradients are calculated, the weights are adjusted a small amount
in the opposite (negative) direction of the gradient. We introduce a propor-
tionality constant η, the learning-rate parameter, to smooth the updating
process. Deﬁne δ
o = .5(y − ˆ y)[ˆ y(1 − ˆ y)]. We then have the weight adjust-














h = g0(x · w
h)δ
ow
o. When the updating of weights is ﬁnished, the
ﬁrm views the next input pattern and repeats the weight-update process.
B Derivation of the ProﬁtF u n c t i o n
This appendix brieﬂy describes the process that leads to equations 1 and 2,
that in the present paper is left in the shadow. Details on the model can be
found in BS (forthcoming).
23B . 1 C o u r n o tC o m p e t i t i o ni na nU n c e r t a i nE n v i r o n -
ment
We have two Cournot duopolists facing the demand function
pt = αt − (q1t + q2t).
where αt changes and is ex ante unknown to ﬁrms. Assume that production




















When deciding output, ﬁrms do not know α, b u th a v et oe s t i m a t ei t .T h e y
only know that it depends on a set of observable environmental variables
x ∈ RN:
αt = α(xt)
where α(·) is unknown. Each period, the ﬁrm views an environmental vector
x and uses this information to estimate the value of α(x).
To measure the complexity of the information processing problem, we
deﬁne environmental complexity as the number of bits in the vector, N,
which, ranges from a minimum of 5 bits to a maximum of 50. Thus, in each
period:
1. Each ﬁrm observes an environmental state vector x.
2. Based on that each ﬁrm estimates a value of the intercept parameter,
ˆ αj. The ﬁrm also estimates its rival’s choice of output, ˆ q
j
−j, where ˆ q
j
−j
is ﬁrm j0s guess of ﬁrm −j0s output.
3. It then observes the true value of and α, and q−j, and uses this infor-
mation to determine its errors using the following rules:









244. Based on these errors, the ﬁrm updates the weight values in its network.
To summarize, the neural network is comprised of three ’layers’: the envi-
ronmental data (i.e., the environmental state vectors), a hidden/managerial
layer, and an output/decision layer. The ’nodes’ in the managerial and de-
cision layers represent the information processing behavior of agents
This process repeats for a number T = 250 of iterations. At the end, we






qit(αt − (q1t + q2t)). (8)
25C Regression Results for Proﬁt
Equation 2 was derived by using the model described in the preceding appen-
dix. We built a data set by making random draws of n ∈ [5,50],m i ∈ [2,20].
We ran the Cournot competition process for T =2 5 0iterations (random
initial conditions were appropriately taken care of by averaging over multiple
runs). We recorded average proﬁtf o rt h et w oﬁr m sc o m p u t e da si ne q .8 ,a n d
the values of m1,m 2, and n. This was repeated 10000 times, in order to ob-
tain a large data set. We then ran a regression to obtain a precise polynomial
form for proﬁt as a function of sizes and environmental complexity. Table 1
gives the complete results of the regression, that is reﬂected in equation 2.
Dependent Variable: 10000 ∗ π1
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Error t-Statistic
Const 287.505 1.947 147.64
m1 7.530 0.674 11.17
m2 -1.166 0.105 -11.15
n -2.954 0.122 -24.23
n2 -0.015 0.004 -3.61
n3 0.00029 0.00005 6.02
m2
1 -0.812 0.104 -7.83
m3
1 0.031 0.007 4.65
m4
1 -0.0005 0.00015 -3.08
m1 ∗ m2 -0.340 0.021 -16.24
(m1 ∗ m2)2 0.001 0.00009 10.75
(m1 ∗ m2)3 -0.000002 0.00000015 -10.35
m1 ∗ n 0.079 0.003 25.81
m2 ∗ n 0.088 0.005 18.34
(m2 ∗ n)2 -0.000035 0.000003 -12.00
m1 ∗ m2 ∗ n 0.001 0.0003 3.36
R-squared 0.8799 Mean dependent var 225.44
Adjusted R-squared 0.8797 S.D. dependent var 23.79
Nobs.: 10,000 S.E. of regression 8.25
Table 1: Proﬁt function for ﬁrm 1. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent
Standard Errors.
26References
[1] Barr, J. and Saraceno, F. (forthcoming). ”Cournot Competition, Orga-
nization and Learning.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
[2] Barr, J. and Saraceno. F. (2004). ”Organization, Learning and Cooper-
ation.” Rutgers University, Newark Working Paper #2004-001.
[3] Barr, J. and F. Saraceno (2002), “A Computational Theory of the Firm,”
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 49, 345-361.
[4] Chandler, Jr., A. D. (1962). Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the His-
tory of the American Industrial Enterprise.T h eM I TP r e s s :C a m b r i d g e .
[5] Chang, M-H, and Harrington, J.E. (forthcoming). ”Agent-Based Models
of Organizations.” Handbook of Computational Economics, Vol 2. Eds
K.L. Judd and L. Tesfatsion.
[ 6 ]C y e r t .R .M .a n dM a r c hJ . G .( 1 9 6 3 ) .A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.
Prentice-Hall, New Jersey.
[7] Currie, M. and Metcalfe, S. (2001). ”Firm Routines, Customer Switch-
ing and Market Selection Under Duopoly.” Journal of Evolutionary Eco-
nomics, 11, 433-456.
[8] DeCanio, S. J. and W. E. Watkins (1998), “Information Processing and
Organizational Structure,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organi-
zation, 36, 275-294.
[9] Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1996). Game Theory. The MIT Press,
Cambridge.
[10] Kopel, M. (1996), “Simple and Complex Adjustment Dynamics in
Cournot Duopoly” Chaos, Soliton & Fractals,7 ,2 0 3 1 - 2 0 4 8 .
[ 1 1 ] N e l s o n ,R .R .a n dW i n t e r ,S .G .( 1 9 8 2 ) .An Evolutionary Theory of Eco-
nomic Change. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge.
[12] Puu, T. (2003). Attractors, Bifurcations & Chaos: Nonlinear Phenom-
ena in Economics. 2nd Ed. Springer, New York.
27[13] Radner, R. (1993), “The Organization of Decentralized Information
Processing,” Econometrica, 61, 1109-1146.
[14] Simon, H. A. (1982). ”Rational Choice and the Structure of the Envi-
ronment.” Psychology Review. 63(2): 129-138. Reprinted in: Behavioral
Economics and Business Organizations. The MIT Press: Cambridge.
[15] Skapura, D. M. (1996), Building Neural Networks, Addison-Wesley, New
York.
28